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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v,

:

CHARLES LOUIS KINSEY,

:

Case No. 890296-CA

Priority Two

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF

OF

R E S P O N D E N T

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of retail theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6602(1) (Supp. 1987); aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978); and of carrying
a concealed weapon, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1987), following a jury trial in
Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable David S. Young, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction in this case under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a)
(Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

excluding the testimony of defendant's witness regarding the
reliability of eyewitness identification.
2.

Whether defendant was properly convicted of retail

theft, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon or
whether the convictions are duplicative because he engaged in

only a single act, and whether the punishment for the retail
theft conviction is constitutionally disproportionate.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1987):
A person commits the offense of retail theft
when he knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries
away, transfers or causes to be carried away
or transferred, any merchandise displayed,
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention
of retaining such merchandise or with the
intention of depriving the merchant
permanently of the possession, use or benefit
of such merchandise without paying the retail
value of such merchandise . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (Supp. 1987)
(amended 1989):
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if
the:
(i) value of the property or
services exceed $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm
or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly
weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the
person of another . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978) (amended
1989):
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if
he commits assault as defined in Section 765-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious
bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a deadly weapon or other
means or force likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree
felony.

-2-

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-504 (Supp. 1987):
(1) Any person, except those persons
described in Section 76-10-503 and those
persons exempted under Section 76-10-510,
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, as
defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor, except that a firearm that
contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a
case, gun box, or securely-tied package shall
not be considered a concealed weapon, but:
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a
firearm and contains no ammunition, he
shall be guilty of a class B
misdemeanor;
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a
firearm and contains ammunition, he
shall be guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; or
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawedoff shotgun, or if the dangerous weapon
is a firearm and is used to commit a
crime of violence, he shall be guilty
of a felony of the third degree.
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent
any person, except persons described in
Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his
place of residence, place of business, or any
vehicle under his control any firearm, except
that it shall be a class B misdemeanor to
carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978):
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish
separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to
promote justice, a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:

n

(a) The offenses are within the
jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitations, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged
or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that
there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that
there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for a conviction for that included
offense, the verdict or judgment of
conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the
included offense, without necessity of a new
trial, if such relief is sought by the
defendant.
United States Const, amend VIII:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted,.
Utah Const, art. I, S 9s
Excessive bail shall not be required;
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor
-4-

shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Charles Louis Kinsey, was convicted
following a jury trial on March 7 and 8, 1989, of retail theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6602(1) (Supp. 1987) (a second degree felony based upon Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1987)); aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, in violation of 76-5-103 (1978) (amended
1989); and carrying a concealed weapon, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1987).

He was

sentenced on April 7, 1989, to one to fifteen years for the
retail theft conviction, to up to five years for the aggravated
assault conviction, and to up to six months for the carrying
concealed weapon conviction.

The sentences were ordered to run

concurrently.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 9, 1987, Wayne Dial, a Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Deputy, was working as a security guard at Sears at
Fashion Place Mall (T. 3, 13). At approximately 11:30 a.m.,
Deputy Dial was observing the sales floor of the store through a
closed circuit television system (T. 14). He observed, and
recorded on videotape, defendant walking through the store
carrying electrical items (T. 16). Defendant entered the men's
restroom; when he exited, he no longer had the electrical items
in his hand (T. 16). Deputy Dial notified another security
guard, Tim Maddox, who is also a police officer, that there was a

possible theft in progress, and that the suspect was leaving the
store (T. 16, 70, 75). Deputy Dial left the video monitor area
in pursuit of defendant (T. 17-18).

He saw defendant walk out of

the store (T. 19). He confronted defendant and identified
himself as a security agent for Sears as he displayed his
identification (T. 19-20).

He told defendant he wanted to talk

with him about the items he took from the store (T. 20).
Defendant brought up his left arm and Deputy Dial grabbed it with
his right hand (T. 20). Officer Kaddox exited the building and
joined Deputy Dial (T. 21, 75). Defendant unbuttoned a couple of
buttons on his green military-type shirt, reached inside, and
handed Deputy Dial two electrical items packaged in Sears
containers (T. 20). When Deputy Dial began a pat-down search, he
asked defendant if he had any weapons (T. 20-21).

Defendant then

broke away from Deputy Dial and pulled a large caliber handgun,
which had been concealed in a holster underneath the right side
of his jacket (T. 21, 76). Defendant held the gun in a combat
position and pointed it back and forth at Dial and Maddox for a
period of from three to five seconds (T\ 22, 23, 78). Defendant
then ran into the mall and escaped (T. 24).
Deputy Dial and Officer Maddox both testified that the
day of the incident was bright and sunny, and that they were not
fatigued or otherwise impaired when they observed defendant (T.
25, 80, 81). Deputy Dial was looking at defendant's face during
the entire incident in order to remember his face for later
identification (T. 34, 45). He closely observed defendant's
facial characteristics, size, and dress, and gave a detailed,

accurate description of his observations (T. 20, 34-36, 38, 59,
61, 64).
Deputy Dial made extensive efforts to locate defendant
after the crime, including going through the files of those
licensed to carry concealed weapons at the Department of Public
Safety and showing the videotape to numerous law enforcement
officers (T. 35-36).

He and Officer Maddox reviewed the videotape

several times (T. 36, 86).
On September 26, 1988, Deputy Dial was beginning his
shift as a security guard at Harmon's grocery store (T. 37). He
saw defendant at the store and immediately recognized him (T. 38).
Defendant stopped short for about five seconds when he saw Deputy
Dial (T. 38). He was subsequently arrested (T. 39). Both
officers positively identified defendant at the preliminary
hearing and at trial (T. 39, 81-82).

The videotape, which

depicted defendant at Sears for about fifteen minutes, was shown
to the jury (T. 41).
Defendant testified he was not sure what he did on
December 9, 1987, but denied having gone to Sears or committing
the theft (T. 147-48, 160). The jury returned a guilty verdict of
retail theft, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon
(T. 164).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Whether to admit the testimony of defendant's witness
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification was within
the discretion of the trial court and, under the circumstances of
this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The defendant was properly convicted of retail theft,
aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon.

His

convictions for retail theft and carrying a concealed weapon did
not result from the same act.

The sentence imposed for the

retail theft conviction was not constitutionally
disproportionate.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.
Defendant claims that the cautionary jury instruction
on the reliability of eyewitness identification approved by the
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986),
was inadequate in the present case, and that the trial court did
not adequately justify the exclusion of defendant's expert
witness on eyewitness identification.

The issue is whether the

trial court abused its discretion in excluding defendant's
proposed expert witness testimony.
A. Whether to Allow Expert Testimony is Within the Discretion of
the Trial Court.
Defendant has relied on State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986) (limited on other grounds, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 1989)),
and State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) as support for
his proposition that the cautionary eyewitness identification
instruction given in this case was insufficient.

In Long, the

Supreme Court discussed research that has demonstrated the
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, and required
trial courts to give a cautionary jury instruction when requested

by a defendant in cases where eyewitness identification is a
central issue.

In determining the remedy for potential problems

in eyewitness identification, the Court stated that "[t]he
approach we adopt today offers a defendant some protection from
false conviction, while ensuring the efficacy of the jury system
by providing jurors with the knowledge necessary for sound
decision making [footnote omitted]."

j[d. at 492.

Defendant's

reliance on Rimmasch for the proposition that the Supreme Court
has taken notice of the unreliability of eyewitness
identification is misplaced (Appellant's Opening Brief at 1);
Rimmasch does not address this issue, but rather clarifies the
standard for the foundational requirements of expert testimony in
general.
The question in this case is not whether eyewitness
identification may be unreliable under some circumstances, but
whether defendant established that the expert testimony was
necessary to explain to the jury the issues covered in the Long
instruction.

In Rimmasch, the Supreme Court discussed the

foundational prerequisites for expert scientific testimony.

The

Court held that in addition to the requirements of Rule 702, Utah
Rules of Evidence, which requires that the proponent of the
testimony establish that it will assist the trier of fact
determine a fact in issue, the proponent must establish the
inherent reliability of the expert testimony.

In order to do so,

the proponent of the testimony can request that judicial notice
be taken; however, a very high level of reliability is required
before the court can take judicial notice.

Icl. at 398.

Alternatively, the proponent can produce evidence to establish
that the scientific principles are sound.

Idi. Further, the

proponent must establish the qualifications of the expert and
that the scientific principles have been properly applied to the
facts of the particular case.

Iji. at 398 n. 7.

In the present case, defendant's proposed witness was
Ed Barton, the chief investigator at the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association (T. 116). Mr. Barton has received some
training in the area of eyewitness identification and is familiar
with the work of Elizabeth Loftus, who has extensively studied
and written about eyewitness identification (T. 118-19).

The

trial court found that Mr. Barton would qualify as an expert in
the area (T. 137). However, the defense made no effort to
establish the inherent reliability of his proposed testimony,
either by way of requesting judicial notice or by producing
evidence, and made to effort to establish that the scientific
principles involved had been properly applied to the facts in the
case at hand.

In fact, Mr. Barton had never seen the videotape

and had no knowledge of what the two eyewitnesses in the case had
observed or experienced (T. 129, 135). Mr. Barton acknowledged
that his testimony would be a "lecture" to the jury on eyewitness
identification in general (T. 129).
The Utah Supreme Court has previously ruled on two
occasions that whether to admit expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitness identification is within the discretion
of the trial court.

State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah

1982); State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981).

In

Griffin, the Court stated it is "in accord with the cases which
hold that whether a jury should have a lecture from a
psychologist as to the credibility of evidence [on eye witness
identification] is within the discretion of the trial court" and
that the trial court is "not compelled to allow such testimony."
Id. at 481.

Defendant has not distinguished these cases and has

cited no authority in opposition to the Utah Supreme Court's
position.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding the
Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Identification.
Defendant claims that the trial court did not
adequately "justify" its exclusion of the testimony of Ed Barton
(Appellant's Opening Brief at 2). The proper inquiry is whether
the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the testimony
inadmissible.

State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981).

"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial aright of the party is
affected . . . .

Utah R. Evid. 103(a).

The trial court may

exclude even relevant evidence based upon "considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."

Utah R. Evid. 403. An appellate court

should not interfere with a trial court's determination on the
admission of evidence unless it clearly appears that the court so
abused its discretion that there was a likelihood of substantial
injustice.

State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982).

Even

trial counsel in the present case acknowledged that the decision
of whether to admit the testimony was within the trial court's
discretion and that its decision would be upheld by the appellate
court (T. 141).

At the request of the prosecution and the defense (T.
143), the trial court gave the jury the cautionary instruction
approved in Long regarding the problems inherent in eye-witness
identification.

(See Appendix A.)

The four-page instruction

addressed all commonly accepted areas of concern.

The

instruction went beyond the frequently used Telfaire

instruction

and was substantively identical to the instruction the Supreme
Court proposed in Long.

The court statcni that if the proposed

instruction were given, "it would certainly satisfy our expressed
concerns about the need for cautionary instructions."

^d. at

495.
The trial court properly excluded the testimony of Ed
Barton.

The court ruled that the proposed testimony would not be

beneficial to the jury and would be in exc€>ss of, or cumulative
to, the "Long" instruction, which had been requested by both
parties (T. 143). It found that the instruction "provides
sufficient caution to the jury" (T. 143). The court also noted
that the videotape in the present case further supported its
decision.

Unlike most other cases involving eyewitness

identification, the videotape gave the two eyewitnesses an
opportunity to refresh their recollection.

The videotape also

gave the jury a "comparative reference" that would not usually be
available in evaluating the evidence (T. 143).
In addition to the reasons set-forth above, which are
more than adequate to support its decision, the trial court noted
additional factors it relied upon in excluding the testimony.
1

United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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The trial court noted the factors discussed in State v.
Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1980), which would provide
additional safeguards against an improper identification.

First,

the prosecution's decision to prosecute this case shows that the
State viewed the evidence as reliable; second, the trial court
could suppress the identification testimony if the identification
procedures rendered the evidence unreliable; third, the crossexamination of officers Dial and Maddox were persuasive,
adequate, careful and competent; fourth, the jury instruction,
which was the instruction recommended in Long, was adequate to
inform the jury of the issues; fifth, the requirement of
unanimity of the jury is an additional safeguard, and, finally,
the trial court has the power to grant relief if it were
convinced that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict
(T. 143-44).

As defendant points out (Appellant's Opening Brief

at 4-5), each factor considered individually may be problematic,
but when considered together, along with the additional factors
present here, the trial court properly determined that the
evidence should be excluded.
Defendant claims that this was "a very close case"
(Appellant's Opening Brief at 5).

On the contrary, the evidence

in this case was very compelling.

There was not one, but two

eyewitnesses who identified defendant.

The eyewitnesses were not

lay people who made observations while not knowing that something
significant was occurring.

Rather the witnesses were trained

police officers who were working as security agents for Sears at
the time (T. 3, 70). Deputy Dial, for example, stood just a few

-13-

feet from defendant as he looked at him squarely in the face (see
T. 22, 34, 64). Knowing that he would later have to identify
him, he paid close attention to detail and was able to describe
with specificity his physical characteristics and clothing (T.
34-36, 59-64).

In addition to the eyewitness testimony,

defendant was actually videotaped in the course of shoplifting
the items from Sears (T. 14-16).

The officers reviewed the

videotape to refresh their recollection; the videotape was shown
to the jury (T. 36, 65. 86). Finally, defendant's unusual style
of dress at the time of the crime and later arrest, including the
green army fatigue shirt and black nylon belt with pouches,
further corroborates the identification (T. 35-36, 38).
Given the circumstances of this case, including the
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification given to the
jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the testimony of defendant's proposed expert witness.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF, AND
SENTENCED FOR, RETAIL THEFT AND CARRYING A
CONCEALED WEAPON.
Defendant claims that he was improperly convicted of,
and sentenced for, both retail theft while armed with a deadly
weapon (a second degree felony) and carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon (a class B misdemeanor).

He argues that the State is

prohibited from convicting for both crimes by Utah Code Ann. § 761-402(1) (1978) which reads:
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant
-i 4_

under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of
this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.
Defendant's sole argument on this point is that
"possession of a weapon by the perpetrator is punishable as an
enhancement to the theft or as a concealed weapon" (Appellant's
Opening Brief at 6). Presumably, defendant's argument is that his
convictions for retail theft and carrying a concealed weapon are
duplicative because they involved "the same act."

The Utah

Supreme Court stated that M[t]he intent of this provision [76-1402(1)] is clear.
single act."

A defendant may not be punished twice for a

State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986).

However, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have found that
where acts that are part of a single criminal episode require
proof of different elements, they constitute separate offenses.
O'Brien, 721 P.2d at 900; State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
To establish second degree felony theft in this case,
the prosecution was required to prove the following elements:
1.

That defendant knowingly

2. took possession of, etc., merchandise
displaced in a retail mercantile
establishment
3. with the intention of retaining the
merchandise or depriving the merchant
permanently of the prosecution
4. without paging the retail value of the
merchandise, and
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5. that the defendant was armed with a^
deadly weapon at the time of the theft.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1987) (amended 1989).

The

crime does not require that the deadly weapon be concealed.
To establish the crime of carrying a concealed weapon
as a class B misdemeanor, the prosecution was required to
establish the following elements:
1. That defendant carried a concealed
dangerous weapon.
Second degree retail theft, as prescmted here, requires
only that the defendant be armed with a deadly weapon.

Carrying

a concealed dangerous weapon requires that the prosecution prove
an additional element:

concealment of the weapon.

Consequently,

the "same act" of the defendant does not establish both seconddegree felony retail theft under §§ 76-6-602(1) and 76-6412(1)(a)(iii) and carrying a concealed weapon under § 76-10-504.
The crimes are separate offenses, requiring proof of separate
elements, and defendant was properly convicted of and sentenced
for both offenses.
Defendant's final argument is that the punishment
imposed was disproportionate to the crimes and constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to

Contrary to defendant's assertion that the deadly weapon
"enhances" the crime, being armed with a deadly weapon, like
establishing value, is an element of the offense. See State v.
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980).
3
If the deadly weapon is a securely packagedr unloaded firearm,
its possession is not illegal. Further, if the deadly weapon is
a firearm and unloaded, the crime is a class B misdemeanor. To
establish a class A misdemeanor, the prosecution would have to
prove that the firearm was loaded at the time of the crime.

the United States Constitution and article 1, section 9 of the
Utah Constitution.

Defendant's reliance on Solem v. Helm, 463

U.S. 277 (1983), is not persuasive.

In Solem, defendant was

given a life sentence without possibility of parole for issuing a
$100 bad check.
In State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986), the
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "[o]nly rarely will a
statutorily prescribed punishment be so disproportionate to the
crime that the sentencing statute is unconstitutional."

The

legislature is accorded substantial deference in determining the
penalty for crimes.

Icl. In determining whether the punishment

is disproportionate, the court must consider the gravity of the
4
offense and the harshness of the penalty. Id..
In the present
case, the gravity of the offenses was extreme.

Defendant

committed retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon, he
assaulted two security agents by actually pointing a gun at them
at close range in a threatening manner, and he concealed the
dangerous weapon in a holster under his jacket.

For these crimes

he received consecutive terms of one to fifteen years, zero to
five years, and up to six months, respectively.

Unlike the

mandatory life sentence in Solem for a $100 bad check, the
punishment here was not constitutionally disproportionate.

The

gravity of the crimes justify the harshness of the penalty.

Although defendant does not argue either of these points, other
considerations are whether the sentence is disproportionate to
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, and sentences for the same crime imposed on
defendants in other jurisdictions. Bishop, 717 P.2d at 269.
-17-

Should this Court find that defendant's convictions and
punishment for retail theft while armed with a firearm and
possession of a concealed dangerous weapon are the result of the
same act and are disproportionate, as defendant argues, the
conviction of the concealed dangerous wcsapon offense should be
regarded as surplusage and the felony retail theft conviction
should not be affected.

In State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah

1985), the Supreme Court ruled that when a defendant has been
improperly convicted of both a greater offense and a lesserincluded offense, the conviction of the lesser-included offense
should be regarded as mere surplusage and the conviction of the
greater offense would remain in unaffected.
However, as set forth above, the convictions and
punishments are neither duplicative nor constitutionally
disproportionate.

It would be the obvious intent of the

legislature to discourage, and appropriately punish, being armed
with a deadly weapon in a situation as potentially violative as
retail theft.

It would also be the clear intent of the

legislature to discourage, and appropriately punish, concealment
of a weapon.

This Court should, therefore, affirm the judgment

of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Charles Louis Kinsey, was properly
convicted of retail theft, aggravated assault, and carrying a
concealed weapon, and his sentence for the convictions was not
constitutionality disproportionate.

-18-

For the reasons discussed

above, and any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the
State of Utah requests that this Court affirm the convictions and
sentence.
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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTION NO.
You

are

the

exclusive

«3>3

judges

of

witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
the

testimony

and credibility

the

witness

apparent
to

shown.
stand,

frankness

know,

their
You

the

facts

other
on

may

the

the

interest

consider

to

of

understand,

consider

and

the weight of

in the

witnesses 1

the

or candor, or the want

should

the

to

result of

or lack thereof to testify fairly,

reasonableness

ability

remember.

bearing

You

of

of the witnesses you have a right

the suit, or any probable motive
is

credibility

In judging

take into consideration their bias, their

if any

the

these

circumstances

truthfulness

of

statements,

it,

and

matters
which

or

their

deportment

their

their
together

you

accuracy

may
of

upon
their

opportunity
capacity

to

with

of

believe

all
have

a

the

witnesses 1

the

credibility

statements.
In judging the weight
of

eyewitnesses

testifying

of the testimony
to

the

who

is an expression of belief or impression by the witness.

considering

what

weight

the

to give

accuracy

of

that

person

testimony

affect

instructed

of

an alleged

factors

are

identity

committed

Many

crime, you

the

and

identification

identification.

to the testimony

of an

In

identifying

eyewitness, you should consider the following:
1.

Did

the

observe the criminal
In answering

witness

have

an

adequate

opportunity

to

actor?
this question, you may consider:

a)

the length
actor;

of

time

the

witness

b)

the distance between the witness and the actor;

c)

the extent to which the
visible and undisguised;

actor 1 s

observed

features

the

were

INSTRUCTION

2.

^>

NO

,

Cont'd

d)

the light or lack of light at the place and time
of observation;

e)

the presence or absence of distracting noises or
activity during the observation;

f)

any other circumstances affecting the witness1
opportunity to observe the person committing the
crime.

Did

the

witness

have

the

capacity

to

observe

the

person committing the crime?
In answering

this question, you may consider whether the

witness* capacity was impaired by:

You

a)

stress or fright at the time of observation;

b)

personal motivations, biases or prejudices;

c)

uncorrected visual defects;

d)

fatigue or injury;

e)

drugs or alcohol.

may

also

consider

whether

different race than the criminal actor.

the

witness

is

of

a

Identification by a person

of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a
person of the same race.
3.

Was

the

witness

sufficiently

attentive

to

the

criminal actor at the time of the crime?
In answering

this question, you may consider

witness knew that a crime was taking place during
she

observed

the

actor.

Even

if

the

witness

whether

the

the time he or
had

adequate

opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal actor, he or she
may not have done so unless he or she was aware that a crime was
being committed.
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4,

Was

the

INU.

witness*

Jj &

,

Cont'd

identification

of

the

defendant

completely the product of his or her own memory?
In answering this question, you may consider:

5.

a)

the length of time that passed
witness1 original observation and
identification of the defendant;

b)

the witness* mental capacity and state of mind
at the time of the identification;

c)

the witness* exposure to opinions, descriptions
or identifications given by other witnesses, to
photographs or newspaper accounts, or to any
other information or influence that may have
affected
the
independence
of
his
or
her
identification;

d)

any
instances
when
the
witness,
or
any
eyewitness to the crime, failed to identify the
defendant;

e)

any
instances
when
the
witness,
or
any
eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of
the
actor
that
is
inconsistent
with
the
defendants appearance;

f)

the circumstances under which the defendant was
presented to the witness for identification.

Was

the

witness*

identification

of

between
his or

the

the
her

defendant

corroborated by other evidence?
You may take into account
picking

the

generally

defendant

more

from

reliable

a

than

that an identification made by

group
an

of

similar

identification

individuals
made

from

is
the

defendant being presented alone to the witness.
You may also take into account
from

seeing

the

person

are

that

generally

identifications
more

reliable

made
than

identifications made from a photograph.
The burden of proving that the defendant is the person who
committed

the crime is on the prosecution.

If, after considering

OOG:
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all

the evidence you have

defense,

including

the considerations
whether

the

heard

evaluating
listed

defendant

NO.

^

from

the

*

c o m ' d

the

prosecution

eyewitness

and

testimony

above, you have a reasonable

is

the

person

who

committed

the

from

the

in light of
doubt

about

crime,

you

must find him not guilty.
If,
as to his

on

the

identity

other
and

you

hand,

you

have

find

all

of

no
the

such reasonable
other

elements

doubt
of

the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find him guilty.
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